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2022-0524 Dangerous Dog Appeal Decision Final Page 1 of 10 CITY OF SPOKANE VALLEY HEARING EXAMINER Re: Appeal by Kathryn Sieck of Dangerous Dog Determination ) ) ) ) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, and DECISION SCRAPS FILE NO. 2022-0524 SUMMARY OF APPEAL AND DECISION Summary of Appeal: The Appellant, Ms. Kathryn Sieck, appealed a dangerous dog (DD) declaration made by Spokane County Regional Animal Protection Service (SCRAPS) regarding a black, neutered male large mixed breed, named “Odie,” owned by her. A complaint was made against the dog by Debbie Anderson on October 10, 2022. Ms. Anderson alleged that the dog bit her without provocation. Decision: The decision of SCRAPS is upheld. FINDINGS OF FACT BACKGROUND INFORMATION Appellant: Kathryn Sieck 13617 E. Wellesley Avenue Spokane Valley, WA 99216 Respondent: Ashley Proszek Field Operations Manager SCRAPS 6815 East Trent Spokane Valley, WA 99212 Complainant: Debbie Anderson 4722 N. Mayhew Road Spokane Valley, WA 99216 Location of Incident: The incident leading to the DD declaration occurred on the property of the Dog Owner’s residence at 13617 E. Wellesley Avenue, Spokane Valley, WA 99216. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION Authorizing Ordinances: Spokane Valley Municipal Code (SVMC) Section 7.30.035. Date of the Incident: October 9, 2022 Date of Decision Being Appealed: December 7, 2022 Page 2 of 10 Date of Appeal: December 8, 2022 Hearing Date: January 18, 2023 Witnesses Present: Ashley Proszek Field Operations Manager SCRAPS 6815 East Trent Spokane Valley, WA 99212 Jesse Ferrari Regional Director SCRAPS 6815 East Trent Spokane Valley, WA 99212 Travis McKinney Animal Protection Officer SCRAPS 6815 East Trent Spokane Valley, WA 99212 Kathryn Sieck 13617 E. Wellesley Avenue Spokane Valley, WA 99216 Debbie Anderson 4722 N. Mayhew Road Spokane Valley, WA 99216 Exhibits: 1. Notice of Hearing to Ms. Sieck and Ms. Anderson dated 12/19/22 2. SCRAPS File, including: A. Request of Administrative Appeal Hearing dated 11/21/22, p. 1 B. Letter from Jesse Ferrari, SCRAPS Director, to Ms. Sieck re: Dangerous Dog / Potentially Dangerous Dog Administrative Review Results dated 12/7/22, pp. 2-4 C. Declaration of Service dated 11/19/22, pp. 5-6 D. D. Uniform Incident Report dated 12/19/22, pp. 7-10 E. Animal Control Issue Summary dated 10/10/22, pp. 11-13 F. Animal Bite Report Form dated 10/10/22, p. 14 G. Affidavit of Probable Cause dated 10/26/22, pp. 15-16 H. Photo Log and eight photos dated 10/9/22, pp. 17-25 I. Letter from Kay Sieck regarding the events of 10/9/22, pp. 26-27 J. Certificate of Vaccination, p. 28 K. Preliminary Declaration of Dangerous Dog packet dated 11/1/22, pp. 29-43 3. Notice of Hearing to Ms. Sieck and Ms. Anderson dated 12/19/22 4. Continuance Correspondence 5. Appellant Documents 6. Appellant Transmittal of Voicemail, with attachments: A. Voicemail Screenshot B. Voicemail Audio File Page 3 of 10 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A hearing was held on this matter on January 18, 2023. The Hearing Examiner has reviewed the exhibits and, based on all materials in the record and the testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing, hereby makes the following Findings and Conclusions: 1. The Appellant, Ms. Kathryn Sieck is the owner of a large, black dog named “Odie.” “Odie” is a mixed-breed, neutered dog. The dog lives with the Appellant and her parents, Kay Sieck and James Sieck, at 13617 E. Wellesley Avenue, Spokane Valley, Washington, 99216. 2. On October 9, 2022, at about 5 p.m., Debbie Anderson, a neighbor of the Siecks, went to their house to check on James Sieck, who had just returned home after surgery. She wanted to let the Siecks know that she was available to assist if they needed any help while Mr. Sieck recovered. She knocked on the door, but there was no answer. She stepped off the porch and began to leave. While she was standing in the driveway, Kay Sieck opened the door to take out the garbage. When she opened the door, “Odie” got out. 3. The dog ran out the front door and lunged at Mrs. Anderson. Mrs. Anderson put her hands up to protect her face, and “Odie” bit both of her arms. Mrs. Anderson fell to the ground, while the dog continued to attack her. “Odie” bit Mrs. Anderson several more times while she was on the ground. Kay Sieck was eventually able to pull the dog off of Mrs. Anderson and get him back into her house. Kay Sieck then went to get Mrs. Anderson’s husband, who took her to the hospital for treatment. 4. The dog attack caused serious injuries to Mrs. Anderson. “Odie” inflicted several bite wounds on Mrs. Anderson. Mrs. Anderson sustained significant bite wounds on her left hand, right leg, right arm, stomach, and right buttock. See Exhibit 2, pp. 17-24 (Photo Log and Photos 1-7). Mrs. Anderson received five stiches on her right leg, six stitches on her right calf, four stitches on her right buttock, one stitch on her right hand, three stitches on her stomach, and ten stitches on her left hand. See Exhibit 2, p. 9; see also Exhibit 2, pp. 22-24. The bite wound to her right arm was so large that it could not be closed with stitches. See Exhibit 2, p. 20 (Photo 3). There was insufficient skin to stitch that wound closed. Testimony of D. Anderson. Fortunately, with medical treatment, the wound eventually healed without the need for skin grafts. See id. 5. On October 10, 2022, Mrs. Anderson submitted a complaint regarding the incident to SCRAPS. See Exhibit 2, p. 8. Animal Protection Officer (APO) McKinney talked with Mrs. Anderson, who described “Odie’s” attack on her and her resulting injuries. Officer McKinney then contacted and spoke with Mr. James Sieck. As it turned out, Mr. Sieck was not present at the time of the incident. He referred APO McKinney to his daughter, Kathryn Sieck, the Appellant/dog owner. APO McKinney spoke with Kathryn Sieck later that day. However, Kathryn Sieck also was not present at the time the dog attack occurred. 6. On October 18, 2022, Mrs. Anderson provided APO McKinney with photographs of the bite wounds inflicted by “Odie.” See Exhibit 2, p. 9; see also Exhibit 2, pp. 17-24 (Photo Log and Photos 1-7). Page 4 of 10 7. On October 26, 2022, Mrs. Anderson completed and signed an affidavit regarding the incident. See Exhibit 2, pp. 15-16. The affidavit corroborates the facts previously related to SCRAPS. See id. On October 31, 2022, SCRAPS received the affidavit, which was returned to SCRAPS by mail. See Exhibit 2, p. 9. 8. On November 1, 2022, SCRAPS prepared a Preliminary Declaration of Dangerous Dog (the “PD”) determining that “Odie” is a “dangerous dog.” See Exhibit 5, p. 003; see also Exhibit 2, p. 9. APO McKinney tried to reach Kathryn Sieck several times in order to arrange to serve the PD on her. See Exhibit 2, p. 9. He also left a voicemail for Ms. Sieck, at 9:49 a.m., explaining that he had forgotten to discuss another step in the process that needed to be completed, namely the administrative review meeting. See Exhibits 6A and 6B (screenshot of voicemail and recording of voicemail). APO McKinney inquired what days Kathryn Sieck would be available to participate in the administrative review meeting and stated that the meeting would include her and the Director of SCRAPS. See Exhibit 6B. 9. The PD states that “Odie” is a “dangerous dog” pursuant to “SVMC 7.30.035, which refers to SCC 5.04.020(8) for the definition of dangerous dog.” See id. The next sentence of the PD begins with the following: “Spokane County Code Section 5.04.020(9) defines a dangerous dog and states: …” See id. The PD then sets forth the complete definition of “dangerous dog.” See id., pp. 9-10. 10. On November 19, 2022, APO McKinney was finally able to reach Ms. Sieck; so he served a copy of the PD on Ms. Sieck at that time. See Exhibit 2, p. 5; see also Exhibit 2, p. 9. Ms. Sieck signed the copy retained by SCRAPs, indicating that she was served with the PD. See Exhibit 2, p. 9; see also Exhibit 2, p. 31. According to the Declaration of Service, Attachment A was included with the PD. See Exhibit 2, p. 5. Attachment A is also included in the PD packet stamped “Copy” and retained by SCRAPs. See Exhibit 2, p. 42. 11. The PD advised Ms. Sieck that an administrative review meeting was scheduled for November 21, 2022, at 8:30 a.m., at SCRAPs. See Exhibit 5, p. 0004. The PD states that if the PD is upheld following the administrative review, the owner or keeper has 15 days to register the dog or appeal the determination. See id. 12. On November 21, 2022, the administrative review meeting was conducted. Kathryn Sieck participated in the meeting, along with the Director of SCRAPS, Mr. Jesse Ferrari, and APO McKinney. See Exhibit 2, p. 10. SCRAPS did not provide any reports or packets of information to Kathryn Sieck during the meeting. Testimony of K. Sieck. Ms. Sieck was able to present any information she desired in opposition to the PD at that time. At the conclusion of the meeting, Director Ferrari gave Ms. Sieck verbal notice that he was upholding the determination that “Odie” is a dangerous dog. See Exhibit 2, p. 10. After the meeting had concluded, Ms. Sieck expressed her intent to appeal the Director’s decision. See id. 13. By memorandum dated December 7, 2022, J. Ferrari, the Director of SCRAPS, issued a written decision following the administrative review meeting. See Exhibit 2, pp. 2-4. The Director confirmed that “Odie” is a “dangerous dog,” consistent with the definition of “dangerous dog” found in SCC 5.04.020(12). See Exhibit 2, p. 2. The Director also concluded that this determination was consistent with the state law definition of “dangerous dog,” set forth in RCW 16.08.070(2). See id. Page 5 of 10 14. On December 8, 2022, SCRAPS hand-delivered a copy of the Director’s written decision following the administrative review meeting to Kathryn Sieck. See Exhibit 2, p. 10. That same day, Ms. Sieck submitted a Request for Administrative Appeal Hearing to SCRAPS, in order to appeal the Dangerous Dog Declaration. See Exhibit 5, p. 0021. Although the appeal is dated November 21, Ms. Sieck did not submit the appeal to SCRAPS until December 8, 2022. See id. The date of receipt is originally written as “11/21/2022.” See id. However, that date is crossed off, and the date “12/8/2022” is added, next to the initials “AP,” for Ashley Proszek, the Field Operations Officer for SCRAPS. The form confirms that “Proszek” is the official who received the appeal. See id. This date of appeal is consistent with the sequence of events (i.e., there was no claim that the appeal was filed prior to the written decision following administrative review), as well as with the testimony of Ms. Proszek and the report by Apo McKinney. See Exhibit 2, p. 10; Testimony of A. Proszek. 15. On December 19, 2022, SCRAPS gave Kathryn Sieck notice that the hearing on her DD appeal would take place on December 21, 2022, at 9:00 a.m., via Zoom. See Exhibit 3, p. 1. SCRAPS also provided information to access the online hearing as well as a copy of the rules of procedure for hearings before the Spokane County Hearing Examiner. See id., pp. 3-7. 16. The incident leading to the DD determination took place in Spokane Valley. Thus, this case is not within the jurisdiction of the Spokane County Hearing Examiner. The Spokane County Hearing Examiner referred the matter to the Spokane Valley Hearing Examiner,1 who agreed to hear the matter on short notice to accommodate SCRAPS and the parties. SCRAPS then issued a second letter notifying Kathryn Sieck of the hearing. See Exhibit 1. In the revised letter, SCRAPS advised Kathryn Sieck that the dangerous dog appeal would be conducted on December 21, 2022, at 1:30 p.m., via WebEx. See id. 17. On December 20, 2022, Kathryn Sieck, through her attorney, requested that the hearing be deferred, most notably because the hearing was scheduled only two days after notice was given. See Exhibit 4, p. 5. SCRAPS agreed with this request. The Hearing Examiner continued the hearing until January 18, 2022, after coordinating a mutually agreeable date with the parties. See Exhibit 4. 18. On January 18, 2023, the Hearing Examiner conducted the hearing on Kathryn Sieck’s appeal. 19. At the hearing, the Appellant’s challenges on appeal were primarily procedural. The Appellant first argued that the appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner was not timely. Specifically, the Appellant pointed out that, under the municipal code, the hearing before the Hearing Examiner “shall be held within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, unless it is continued for good cause shown.” See SVMC 7.30.035(E). SCRAPS did not provide notice of the hearing until December 19, only two days before the scheduled date, December 21. This was insufficient notice, given that at least five days’ notice of the hearing is required. See id. In addition, SCRAPS scheduled the hearing before the wrong hearing examiner; although this error did not prevent the matter from being heard on 1 The City of Spokane Hearing Examiner acts as the hearing examiner for the City of Spokane Valley pursuant to an interlocal agreement. Page 6 of 10 December 21. Rather than proceeding, however, the matter was continued to a mutually acceptable date (i.e., January 18, 2023). 20. The appeal was filed December 8. Therefore, the hearing should have taken place on or before December 28, 2022, in order to strictly comply with the rule. The parties’ discussion of a mutually agreeable date took place on December 20. There was still sufficient time, as of that date, to ensure five days’ notice of the hearing and schedule the hearing to take place within 20 days of the appeal. Ms. Sieck could have demanded a hearing within that time frame, it appears. However, Ms. Sieck requested the hearing be continued to a date no earlier than January 10, in order to permit her attorney time to prepare for the hearing. See Exhibit 4, p. 5. The request was made pursuant to the municipal code, which allows continuance for “good cause shown.” The parties then ultimately agreed to continue the matter to January 18, which was the mutually acceptable date for both the parties and the Hearing Examiner. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Examiner concludes that the hearing was not improperly held outside the 20-day time limit. There was mutual agreement on the date for the hearing. 21. The Appellant was right to object to a hearing on two days’ notice. And although SCRAPS made multiple procedural errors in scheduling the matter, the parties mutually selected a date that would provide the Appellant with adequate notice and sufficient time to mount her defense. The important thing is that the Appellant was provided with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard. That occurred in this case, the scheduling change notwithstanding. 22. Even setting that aside, however, the municipal code does not set forth the consequences of the failure to conduct the hearing within 20 days. The Hearing Examiner believes this rule is intended to ensure speedy resolution of these kinds of cases, in particular in situations where the dog is being held by SCRAPS at the expense of the owner. However, if the hearing takes place expeditiously, under the given circumstances, the Hearing Examiner does not agree that dismissal of the complaint is proper. If the hearing time-frame was jurisdictional in effect, the municipal code should say so. The Appellant did not cite to any authority in support of the theory that the 20-day time-frame was jurisdictional and, therefore, dismissal was required. 23. There are many reasons why a hearing might not take place within 20 days, including the lack of availability of the Hearing Examiner, to name one example. Moreover, if the Hearing Examiner were to dismiss a case based solely upon the failure to timely conduct the hearing, he would require a showing of prejudice. In this case, there was no evidence at all that the Appellant was deprived the opportunity to appeal the matter, challenge the claims, present her evidence, etc., because of the failure to conduct the hearing within 20 days. Unless the delay creates a material prejudice on the rights of an appellant, it is not proper to dismiss the case on such grounds. 24. The Appellant next argues that the PD should be dismissed because it is legally defective. The Appellant advanced two primary reasons for this contention. First, the Appellant contended that the PD failed to set forth the statutory basis for the declaration, as required by SVMC 7.30.035(B)(1). Second, the Appellant contended that the PD fails to set forth the reasons SCRAPS considers the dog dangerous, as required by SVMC 7.30.035(B)(3). In particular, the Appellant argues that SCRAPS failed to include Page 7 of 10 Attachment A with the PD. The Appellant notes that such information was not provided to her until much later (i.e., December 19, 2022). 25. The Hearing Examiner rejects the claim that the PD fails to state the statutory basis for the determination. The Appellant is correct that the PD improperly references SCC 5.04.020(8), which defines the term “cat,” and SCC 5.04.020(9), which defines “commercial kennel.” However, the PD explicitly states the intent to refer to the definition of “dangerous dog,” and the PD immediately sets forth that entire definition. One need only peruse SCC 5.04 for a moment to see the error and locate the definition of “dangerous dog,” which is found at SCC 5.04.020(12). Only the subsection number is in error. These are clerical errors, but there is no doubt about the authorities or the basis for the determination. 26. The Hearing Examiner also disagrees that the reasons for the determination are lacking. The PD refers to Attachment A for the rationale for the determination. Kathryn Sieck testified that she did not receive the attachment or any report at the time the PD was served. However, the Hearing Examiner is inclined to accept APO McKinney’s testimony that the attachment was included in the packet that was hand-delivered to her. Attachment A is included in the packet stamped “copy” that was retained by SCRAPS at the time of the service. That copy includes Kathryn Sieck’s signature of receipt. 27. In addition, Attachment A is not the incident report prepared by APO McKinney, as the Appellant seems to assume. The document marked “Attachment A” is the “Animal Bite Report Form” submitted to the Department of Health. That form identifies the dog, the victim, the date and place where the dog attack occurred, and the basic details of the incident. See Exhibit 2, p. 42. The Hearing Examiner concludes that this information is sufficient to set forth the reasons for the dangerous dog determination. 28. Even if Attachment A was not included, there was no mystery about the reasons that “Odie” was being declared dangerous. The Appellant was well informed of those reasons, including discussing the case in the administrative review meeting. In addition, the definition itself, set forth at the beginning of the PD, provides the basic rationale for the determination (i.e., her dog inflicted a severe injury on a person without provocation). 29. The Appellant next argues that the order following the administrative review meeting was not timely. The municipal code provides that the order of the Director shall be issued within 15 calendar days of the administrative review meeting. See SVMC 7.30.035(C)(2). In this case, the administrative review meeting took place on November 21, 2022. The order following administrative review, therefore, was due on December 6, 2022. As the Appellant argues, the order was not issued until December 7, 2022, one day after that deadline. At the hearing, SCRAPS explained that it calculated the 15 days starting the day after the review meeting, and claimed that the code did not require otherwise. The Hearing Examiner concludes that SCRAPS miscalculated the deadline under the standard procedures for determining such deadlines. The question here is whether the PD should be wholly dismissed as a result of missing this deadline by 24 hours. 30. The Hearing Examiner concludes that the tardiness of the order does not justify dismissal of the complaint. The code does not set forth the consequences of missing this deadline or express the idea that this deadline has jurisdictional effect. There is also no evidence that the issuance of the order, one day after the deadline, worked any prejudice Page 8 of 10 upon the Appellant. Moreover, the Appellant did not cite any authority to support the claim that the case must be dismissed as a result of the lateness of the order. 31. The Appellant’s final procedural objection is that the Director’s order does not set forth a concise statement of facts supporting the determination, as required by SVMC 7.30.035(C)(2). The Hearing Examiner disagrees. The Director’s order states that the “determination was made following Spokane County Ordinance § 5.04.020(12),” which defines the term “dangerous dog.” See Exhibit 2, p. 2. The order then states that Odie was deemed dangerous because he inflicted a “severe injury or multiple bites on a human being without provocation on public or private property.” See id. This was a sufficient statement to provide notice of the basis of the claim, albeit barely so. That said, the order had the effect of finalizing the PD, which was previously served on the Appellant. That PD, as already discussed above, included Attachment A, which set forth the basic facts underlying the determination. 32. The order further states that an incident report is attached. This report contains the details of the incident and SCRAPS’ investigation into the matter. However, the Hearing Examiner accepts Kathryn Sieck’s testimony that no incident report or other documents were provided to her at the administrative review meeting on November 21. There is no evidence that the incident report was served on her along with the Director’s order on December 8. Indeed, as the Appellant argues, the incident report was not finalized and signed until December 19. See Exhibit 2, p. 10. However, the Appellant received the incident report on that date, December 19, which Appellant confirmed at the hearing. 33. The Hearing Examiner concludes that SCRAPS did not provide the Appellant with the attachment to the order (i.e., the incident report) until December 19, eleven days after the order was issued. If there was an error in failing to include additional, factual details forming the basis for the Director’s decision, that issue was addressed when the incident report was subsequently delivered. The fact that the Appellant had to wait an additional eleven days to review the report ultimately had no effect in this case. The matter was continued to January 18. She had a month to review the matter and prepare her defense, and she was already well informed of the facts of the case. Again, no prejudice is apparent on this record, and the codes do not set forth specific guidance on the consequences of the lack of a statement of facts (assuming arguendo that the above quoted language is not sufficient). And as with other claims, the Appellant did not cite to any authority calling for the outright dismissal of the case based upon the insufficiency of the order issued by the Director. 34. Under SVMC 7.30.035(A), which adopts Chapter 5.04 of the Spokane County Code (SCC) by reference, the term “dangerous dog” includes a dog that “inflicts severe injury or multiple bites on a human being without provocation on public or private property.” See SCC 5.04.020(12). 35. The term “severe injury” means “any physical injury that results in a broken bone, disfigurement, laceration requiring suture(s) or surgery, or multiple bites requiring medical treatment.” See SCC 5.04.020(26). 36. “Odie” attacked Mrs. Anderson and bit her multiple times, causing severe injuries to several parts of her body. Several bite wounds required sutures to close, and one was so significant that it could not be closed with stitches. This attack took place without any Page 9 of 10 provocation. The Appellant suggested that Mrs. Anderson should have called before coming over. Mrs. Anderson denied being told to do so. The Hearing Examiner finds this dispute to be irrelevant. Under the facts of this case, “Odie” ran out the door when it was opened and attacked Mrs. Anderson without hesitation or warning. Mrs. Anderson was not even moving, let alone doing anything to provoke the dog. The dog was attacking her before she could even react. 37. The Hearing Examiner concludes that the attack occurred without provocation, as that term is defined in the municipal code. See SCC 5.04.020(34). The Appellant did not make any specific argument in support of a claim of “provocation.” In any case, “Odie” was not being tormented or physically abused at the time of the incident. The dog was not defending himself, his owner/keeper, or anyone else nearby from an “imminent physical attack.” The dog was not defending his owner’s premises from willful trespass2 or another criminal act. In this case, there is no evidence of any act of provocation. 38. The Appellant did not dispute the substantive facts giving rise to the complaint. Rather, the Appellant argued that the dog has a good disposition, enjoys playing and going for rides, and is outgoing. The Appellant characterized the dog’s behavior in this case as unexpected and highly unusual. The Appellant also explained that she would be moving into a new house with a large fence to keep “Odie” from interacting with strangers in the future. The Appellant suggested that the determination should be reduced to “potentially dangerous dog.” She worried that the dangerous dog restrictions would impact the quality of “Odie’s” life. 39. The Hearing Examiner is sympathetic to the Appellant’s concerns, and commends her efforts to mitigate the risks created by her dog’s behavior. However, “Odie’s” behavior was obviously dangerous. The injuries to Mrs. Anderson were extensive and serious. The Hearing Examiner cannot overlook the physical damage that was inflicted, without any apparent cause or reason. The Hearing Examiner worries about public safety given a dog that could inflict such harm without warning. In order to reduce the determination to “potentially dangerous,” the Hearing Examiner would have to conclude that the injuries were of a much milder nature. In other words, the Hearing Examiner would have to conclude that SCRAPS’ assessment of the injuries was in error, or that the injuries were not truly “severe.” See e.g. SCC 5.04.020(22) (defining “potentially dangerous dog”); see also SVMC 7.30.035(F) (stating that the Hearing Examiner may reduce the designation to “potentially dangerous,” but only “if the facts warrant” that modification). The Hearing Examiner cannot agree with such an outcome. One need only look at the hospital photos to be convinced that “Odie” poses a real danger to others. 40. The Appellant’s attorney, David Sieck, remarked that if this case is representative of how SCRAPS proceeds in these kinds of cases, those procedures need to be revisited, or words to that effect. The Hearing Examiner agrees with this sentiment, notwithstanding the ultimate conclusions reached. The procedural history is sloppy, to put it mildly. There seemed to be form and timing errors throughout the record, creating doubt about the 2 In closing arguments, the Appellant suggested there was a question of fact as to whether Mrs. Anderson was trespassing on the Siecks’ property at the time of the attack. This was a passing remark at the end of the final, closing statement. There was no prior discussion of an alleged trespass. No evidence was introduced during the hearing to elucidate this issue, and it was not genuinely addressed by either party during the proceedings. In addition, no authorities were cited and the issue was not briefed. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Examiner, therefore, refuses to consider this claim. Page 10 of 10 process and giving rise to legitimate questions by the Appellant. SCRAPS is fortunate that the Hearing Examiner did not dismiss this case based merely on the accumulation of errors, even if those errors individually considered were not sufficient to warrant such a result. The Hearing Examiner strongly suggests that SCRAPS review its standard procedures and take steps to ensure that these matters are documented and scheduled with greater care and precision. DECISION Based on the findings and conclusions above, it is the decision of the Hearing Examiner to uphold the determination by SCRAPS that the dog is a dangerous dog. The Appellant will have to comply with the requirements for owning and keeping a dangerous dog as set forth in applicable law. SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2023. _________________________________ Brian T. McGinn City of Spokane Valley Hearing Examiner NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL Decisions by the Hearing Examiner regarding dangerous dog determinations are final. They may be appealed to the Spokane County Superior Court. THE APPEAL MUST BE FILED AND THE CITY OF SPOKANE VALLEY MUST BE SERVED WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE DECISION SET OUT ABOVE. The date of the decision is the 1st day of February, 2023. THE DATE OF THE LAST DAY TO APPEAL IS THE 16th DAY OF FEBRUARY 2023, AT 5:00 P.M. In addition to paying any Court costs to appeal the decision, you may be required to pay a transcript fee to cover the costs of preparing a verbatim transcript, and otherwise preparing a full record for the Court.